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Why Only Us (WOU) is a wonderful, slim, engaging, and clearly written book by 
Robert C. Berwick and Noam Chomsky (B&C). From the authors’ perspective, it 
is a book about language and evolution. And of course it is. However, I think it is 
actually about something much bigger. It is an argument about the evolution of 
thought itself, with language being not only one form of thought, but a domain 
that can impact thought itself, in ways that are truly unique in the animal king-
dom. Seen in this light, WOU provides a framework for thinking about the evo-
lution of thought and a challenge to Darwin’s claim that the human mind is only 
quantitatively different from other animals. Since this is an idea that I have cham-
pioned (Hauser 2009), I am of course a bit partial. Let me unpack all of this by 
working through B&C’s arguments, especially those where we don’t quite agree.  
 One caveat up front: As I have written before, including with B&C (Hauser 
et al. 2014), I am not convinced that the ideas put forward here or in WOU are 
testable: Animal capacities are far too impoverished to shed any comparative 
light on the evolution of human language, and the hominid fossil record is either 
silent or too recent to be of interest. My goal here, therefore, is to focus on the 
fascinating ideas raised in WOU, leaving to the side how or whether such ideas 
might be confronted by significant empirical tests.  
 One of the essential moves in WOU is to argue that Merge—the simplest 
recursive operation—is the bedrock of our capacity for infinite expression by 
finite means, one that generates hierarchical structure. Because no other animal 
has Merge, and because Merge is simple and the essence of language, the evolu-
tionary process may well have occurred rapidly, appearing suddenly in only one 
species: modern humans or Homo sapiens sapiens (Hss). To accept this argument, 
you have to accept at least five premises: 
 
(1) Merge is the essence of language. 
(2) No other animal has Merge. 
(3) No other hominid has Merge. 
(4) Due to the simplicity of Merge, it could evolve quickly, perhaps due to 
mutation. 
(5) Because you either have or don’t have Merge (there is no demi-Merge), 
there is no option for proto-language. 
																																																													
   This piece originally appeared as a post on the Faculty of Language blog on 29 February 2016 
(http://facultyoflanguage.blogspot.com.cy/2016/02/hauser-reviews-why-only-us.html). 
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 I accept (2) because the comparative literature shows nothing remotely like 
Merge. Whether one looks at data from natural communication, artificial lang-
uage learning experiments, or animal training studies with human language or 
language-like tokens, there is simply no evidence of anything remotely recursive. 
As B&C note, the closest one gets is the combinatoric gymnastics observed in bird-
song, but these are neither recursive nor do they generate hierarchical structures 
that shape or generate the variety of meaningful expressions observed in all hu-
man languages. 
 I also accept (3), though here we don’t really have the evidence to say one 
way or the other, and even if we did, and it turned out that say Neanderthals had 
Merge, it wouldn’t really make much of a difference to the argument. That is, the 
fossil record for Neanderthal, though richer than we once thought, says nothing 
about recursive operations, and nor for that matter does the fossil record for Hss. 
Both records show interesting signs of creative thought—a topic to which I return 
—but nothing that would indicate recursive thought or expression. If evidence 
emerges that Neanderthals had Merge, that would simply push back the date of 
origin for B&C’s evolutionary account, without changing the core details. 
 Let’s turn to (1), (4), and (5) then. What is interesting about the core argu-
ment in WOU is that, although B&C place significant emphasis on Merge, they 
fully acknowledge that the recursive machinery must interface with the 
Conceptual-Intentional system (CI) on the one hand, and with the Sensory-Motor 
system (SM) on the other. However, once one acknowledges the non-trivial roles 
of CI, SM, and the interfaces, while also recognizing the unique properties of each 
of these systems, it is no longer possible to accept premise (4), and challenges 
arise for premise (5). This analysis lays open the door to some fascinating 
possibilities, many of which might be explored empirically. I consider a few next. 
 B&C devote some of the early material of WOU to review work on vocal 
imitation in songbirds, including comparative genetic and neurobiological data. 
In some ways, the songbird system is a lovely example because the work is 
exquisitely detailed and shows some nice parallels with our own. In particular, 
songbirds learn their song in some of the same ways as young children learn 
language, including evidence of an innate system that constrains both the timing 
and material acquired. However, there are elements of the songbird system that 
are strikingly different from our own, not mentioned in WOU, but when acknow-
ledged, tell an even more interesting tale about the evolution of Hss—one that is 
at the same time supportive of the uniqueness claims in WOU while also raising 
questions about the nature of the uniqueness claim. Specifically, the songbird 
system is a striking example of extreme modularity. The capacity of a songbird to 
imitate or learn its species-specific song is not a capacity that extends to other 
calls in its vocal repertoire, nor to any visual display. That is, a songbird can 
imitate the song material it hears, but nothing else. Not so for our species, where 
the capacity to imitate is amodal, or at least bimodal, with sounds and actions 
copied readily, and from birth. This disconnect from sensory modality is a 
trademark of human thought, and of course, is a critical feature of our language 
faculty: At virtually all levels of detail, including syntax, semantics, phonology, 
and pragmatics as well as acquisition, there are no differences between signed 
and spoken languages. No other animal is like this. Whether we observe 
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songbirds, dolphins, or non-human primates, an individual born deaf does not 
emerge with a comparably expressive visual system of communication. The 
systems of communicative expression are intimately tied to the modality, such 
that if one modality is damaged, other modalities are incapable of picking up the 
tab. The fact that our language, and even more broadly, our thoughts, are de-
tached from modality, suggests a fundamental reorganization in our represen-
tations and computations. This takes us to CI, SM, and the interfaces—and 
Merge. 
 Given the modularity of the songbird system, and the lack of imitative 
capacities in non-human primates, we also need an account of how a motor 
system capable of imitating sounds and actions evolved. This is an account of 
how SM evolved, but also about how and when SM interfaced with CI and 
Merge. There is virtually no evidence on offer, and it is hard to imagine what 
kind of evidence could emerge. For example, the suggestion that Neanderthals 
had a hyoid bone like Hss is interesting, but doesn’t tell us what they were doing 
with it, whether it was capable of being deployed in vocal imitation, and thus, of 
building up the lexicon. And of course, we don’t know whether or how it was 
connected to CI or Merge. But whatever we discover about this account, it show-
cases the importance of understanding the evolution of at least one unique 
property of SM. 
 When we turn to CI, and in particular, lexical or conceptual atoms, we 
know extremely little about them, even in fully linguistics human adults. 
Needless to say, this makes comparative and developmental work difficult. But 
one observation seems fairly uncontroversial: Many of our concepts are 
completely detached from sensory experiences, and thus can’t be defined by 
them. If we take this as a starting point, we can ask: Do animals have anything 
remotely like this? On one reading of Randy Gallistel’s elegant work, the answer 
is “Yes” (e.g., Gallistel 1990). All of the empirical work on number, time, and 
space in animals suggests that such concepts are either not linked to or defined 
by a particular modality, or minimally, can be expressed in multiple modalities. 
Similarly, there is evidence that animals are capable of representing some sense 
of identity or sameness that is not tied to a modality. If this is right, and even if 
these concepts are not as abstract as ours, they suggest a potential comparative 
approach that at this point, seems closed off for our recursive capacity. Having a 
comparative evolutionary landscape of inquiry not only aids in our analyses, it 
also raises a challenge to premises (4) and (5), as well as to Richard Lewontin’s 
comment (supported by B&C) that we can’t study or understand the evolution of 
cognition (Lewontin 1990). Let me take a small detour to describe a gorgeous 
series of studies on the evolution of cognition to show what can and has been 
done, and then return to premises (4) and (5). 
 In most monogamous species, the male and female share the same home 
range or territory. In polygynous species, in contrast, there are several females 
associated with one male, and thus, the male’s home range area encompasses all 
of the smaller female home ranges. Based on this observation, Steve Gaulin and 
his colleagues (e.g., Gaulin & Wartell 1990; Jacobs et al. 1990; Puts et al. 2007) 
predicted that the spatial abilities of a monogamous vole would show no sex 
differences, whereas males would show greater abilities than females in a closely 
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related polygynous vole species. Using a maze running task to test for spatial 
capacity, results provided strong support for the prediction. Further, the size of 
the hippocampus—an area of the brain known to play an important role in 
spatial navigation—was significantly larger in males of the polygynous species 
when contrasted with females, whereas no sex differences were found for the 
monogamous species. This, and several other examples, reveal how one can in 
fact study the evolution of cognition. Lewontin is, I believe, flatly wrong. 
 Back to premises (4) and (5). If nonhuman animals have abstract, amodal 
concepts—as some authors suggest—then we have a significant line of empirical 
inquiry into the evolution of this system. If our concepts are unique—as authors 
such as B&C believe—then there may not be that many empirical options. Per-
haps Neanderthals have such concepts, perhaps not. Either way, the evolutionary 
timescale is short, and the evidence thus far, relatively thin. On either account, 
however, there is the pressing need to understand the nature of such concepts as 
they bear on what I believe is the most interesting side effect of this discussion, 
and the issues raised in WOU. In brief, if one concedes that what is unique about 
language, and thus, its evolutionary history, is Merge, CI, SM, and the interfaces, 
then a different issue emerges: Are these four ingredients unique to language or 
part of all aspects of human thought? Said differently, perhaps WOU is really an 
account of how our uniquely human system of thought evolved, with language 
being only one domain in terms of its internal and external systems of expression. 
B&C often refer to our Language of Thought, as the core of language, and what is 
our most dominant use of language: internal thought. On this view, external-
ization of this system in expressed language is not at the core of the evolutionary 
account. On the one hand, I agree. On the other hand, I think the use of the term 
of ‘Language of Thought’ or LOT has confused the issue because of the multiple 
uses of the word ‘language’. If the essence of the argument in WOU is about the 
computations and representations of thought, with linguistic thought being one 
flavor, then I would suggest we call this system the Logic of Thought. I suggest this 
substitution of L-words for two reasons. Language of Thought implies that the 
system is explicitly linguistic, and I don’t believe it is. Further, I think Logic of 
Thought better captures the abstract nature of the ingredients, including both the 
recursive operations, concepts, motor routines, and interfaces. 
 The Logic of Thought, I would argue, is uniquely human, and underpins 
not only language, but many other domains as well. It explains, I believe, why 
actions that appear similar in other animals are actually not similar at all. It also 
provides the ultimate challenge to Darwin’s argument that there is continuity in 
mental thought between humans and other animals, with differences attributable 
to quantity as opposed to quality. In contrast, if the ideas discussed here, and 
ultimately raised by B&C are right, then it is the Logic of Thought that is unique 
to humans. The Logic of Thought includes all four ingredients: Merge, CI, SM, 
and the interfaces. How these components are articulated in different domains is 
fascinating in its own right, and raises several additional puzzles. For example, if 
Merge is the simplest recursive operation, is it one neural mechanism that 
interfaces with different, domain-specific concepts and actions, or were merge 
like circuits effectively cloned repeatedly, each subserving a different domain? 
The first possibility suggests that damage to this singular Merge circuit would 
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reveal deficits in multiple domains. The second option suggests that damage to 
the Merge circuit in one domain would only reveal deficits in this domain. To my 
knowledge, there is no evidence of neuropsychological deficits or imaging 
studies that point to the nature or distribution of such recursive circuitry. 
 In sum, WOU is really a terrific book. It is thought provoking and clear. 
What more could you want? My central challenge is that it paints an evolutionary 
account that can only work if the essence of language is simple, restricted to 
Merge. But language is much more than this. As such, there has to be more to the 
evolutionary process. By raising these issues, I believe B&C have challenged us to 
think about another option, one that preserves their title, but focuses on the logic 
of thought. Why only us? Much to think about. 
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